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I. INTRODUCTION 
a. Spanish-American Trade Relations 
Spanish-American trade relations during the American Revolution set the stage for the 
trading relationship between James Barry and Spanish firm Manella, Pujals & Co. (“Manella”) at 
issue in Manella v. Barry.1  The Spanish empire at this time was the fourth largest empire in 
history, and the restrictive economic policies of the crown existed to preserve and later regain 
that status.2  Because of its geographic proximity, Cuba was an attractive and convenient trading 
partner for American merchants, and was the initial Spanish-American trading venue.  Flour was 
the primary import into Cuba from the Thirteen Colonies, and Spain could not adequately supply 
the need for flour in Cuba because of problems with transportation and high demand from the 
other Spanish colonies.3  During the American Revolution, Spanish ships supplying Havana 
could not be assured safe passage because of vulnerability to privateers between Cuba and 
Europe, so the Spanish crown had to allow America to trade with Cuba and nearby colonies for 
flour and other needs.  In 1780, the first American ships delivered goods to Cuba, and imports 
grew from 1780 to 1783.4 
Spain controlled imports to the colonies through a policy of exclusivism, but could not 
meet the colonies’ demand for goods during wartime, in part because of losses at the hands of 
English and French privateers.5  The crown was so staunch in its mercantilist economic policy  
                                                     
1 7 U.S. 415 (1806). 
2 http://basementgeographer.com/counting-down-the-ten-largest-empires-in-history-nos-5-1/. 
3 James A. Lewis, Anglo-American Entrepreneurs in Havana: The Background and Significance of the Expulsion of 
1784 – 1785, in THE NORTH AMERICAN ROLE IN THE SPANISH IMPERIAL ECONOMY, 1760-1819, 112, 116 (Jacques 
A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, eds., 1984). 
4 Id. at note accompanying Table 38. 
5 John H. Coatsworth, American Trade with European Colonies in the Caribbean and South America, 1790 – 1812, 
24 THE WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY 243, 243 (1967). 
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that rather than relax import regulations when demand from the colonies peaked in the 1790s, 
Spain issued debt and levied taxes to fund government operations during wartime.6   
Spain’s import policy also created a corrupt trading climate rife with unfair competition 
between domestic merchants. The crown’s mercantilistic policies benefitted larger merchants. 
and smaller merchants could not offer competitive prices under the crown’s high taxes.  This led 
smaller merchants to trade illegally outside of the royal monopoly, usually with foreign 
merchants.7  Thus, during the period from 1793 to 1799, American exports to Spanish America 
rose steadily and peaked at $8.9 million, accounting for thirty-five percent of U.S. Exports.8 
This environment of domestic merchants evading government regulation through 
clandestine trade practices characterized the tobacco industry in particular.  The Spanish crown 
used a royal monopoly to regulate the tobacco industry.  In the 1770s, the most popular type of 
tobacco in Spain, a variety called cura seca, was produced in Venezuela.9  In 1777, the Spanish 
crown established a monopoly for Venezuelan tobacco, controlling the amount grown and 
mandating that the entire crop be sold to the royal monopoly.10  The tobacco monopoly 
accounted for twenty percent of the King’s revenue, and illustrates the crown’s significant 
dependence on the colonies as a source of income.11  Any surplus tobacco was marketed for sale 
by the monopoly to North American merchants who had previously been allowed trading 
privileges.12  These merchants would sell the tobacco domestically or export it to foreign 
                                                     
6 Harold A. Bierck, Tobacco Marketing in Venezuela, 1798-1799: An Aspect of Spanish Mercantilistic Revisionism, 
39 THE BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW 494, 490 (1965). 
7 See Roy F. Nichols, Trade Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish America, 
1779 – 1809, 13 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 289, 289 (1933). 
8 John H. Coatsworth, supra note 5 at 252. 
9 Harold A. Bierck, supra note 6 at 492. 
10 Id. 
11 DAVID R. RINGROSE, SPAIN, EUROPE, AND THE 'SPANISH MIRACLE', 1700-1900, 113 (Cambridge University Press 
1996). 
12 Harold A. Bierck, supra note 6 at 493. 
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countries such as Holland.13  Eventually there came to be a tobacco surplus in Venezuela, and in 
1796, the tobacco monopoly attempted to sell tobacco to neutral non-American merchants in 
exchange for trading rights with Spain.14  These efforts were unsuccessful, so the monopoly 
looked to the United States for potential sales opportunities, finding great success until 1799 
when the crown closed all trade with foreign neutrals.15 
b. The Role of Spanish Consuls 
Upon the signing of a treaty negotiated by Thomas Pinkney in 1795, Spain began sending 
consuls to the United States.16  By the end of that year, Spain had consuls in eight major 
American cities.17  The crown employed merchants as Spanish consuls because merchants had 
already built trading and social networks with United States merchants, so they had a foundation 
from which to build ongoing business relationships.18  The consuls in Cadíz and America forged 
business relationships on behalf of the crown because they were able to identify merchants on 
both shores who were willing to buy and sell goods on consignment.19  These consignment 
relationships were lucrative for both parties, as evidenced by the records of John Stoughton (c. 
1745–1820).20   
As Spanish consul for New England from 1795–1820, Stoughton brokered relationships 
between at least thirty-six Spanish merchants, including Bernardo Lacosta, who was involved in 
Manella v. Barry.21  Stoughton’s son in law, José de Jáudenes, named Stoughton to his position 
                                                     
13 Id. at 492. 
14 Id. at 494. 
15 Id. at 495. 
16 Sean Perrone, Spanish Consuls and Trade Networks between Spain and the United States, 1795–1820, 38 J. 
ASS’N. FOR SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE HIST. STUD., 75, 77 (2013). 
17 Id. at 76. 
18 Id. at 77. 
19 Harold A. Bierck, supra note 6 at 492. 
20 Sean Perrone, supra note 16 at 75. 
21 Id. at 93. 
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as Spanish consul to the United States from 1791 – 1795.22  Jáudenes’ successor was the 
Marqués de Casa Irujo, business associate of James Barry.23  Thus, it is likely that Stoughton and 
Barry were business associates in the Spanish-American trade networks, though it was Bishop 
John Carroll who first introduced Barry to Jáudenes and Irujo.24 
Merchants initially shipped goods to Cuba through permits controlled by Spanish consuls 
which required the payment of fees of up to one third the cost of the commodities being traded.25  
When Spain reentered the war in 1796, trade policies shifted from a permit system to a 
monopoly system, but existing relationships between consuls and merchants continued to be the 
primary avenue for doing business.26  For example, Spanish Minister Irujo called on James Barry 
to supply 20,000 barrels of flour to Puerto Rico on credit in exchange for permission to trade 
with Cuba.27  Irujo and Barry had established a business relationship under the permit system, 
which they continued to leverage despite the change in the crown’s import policy.  By November 
of 1797, the royal monopolies could not meet the demand for supplies and the crown opened 
Cuba and all other Spanish ports to trade with American merchants.28   
The period of Spanish prosperity from 1797 – 1799 consisted in part of profits from 
contraband trade.29  The importation of contraband tobacco was a profitable endeavor because of 
the high taxes levied by the Crown’s Venezuelan tobacco monopoly.30  Contraband trade was 
significant enough to be included in an accounting of Spain’s payments for and income from 
                                                     
22 Id. at 77. 
23 Linda K. Salvucci, Anglo-American Merchants and Stratagems for Success in Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-
1807, in THE NORTH AMERICAN ROLE IN THE SPANISH IMPERIAL ECONOMY, 1760-1819, 127, 129 (Jacques A. 
Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, eds., 1984). 
24 See infra Part VII. 
25 Roy F. Nichols, supra note 7 at 294. 
26 Id. at 296. 
27 Id. at note 23. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at note 25. 
30 See FREDERICK AUGUSTUS FISCHER, TRAVELS IN SPAIN IN 1797 AND 1798 (A. Strahan, Printers-Street 1802) (full 
text available on Google Books); Roy F. Nichols, supra note 7 at note 12. 
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trade with her colonial territories.31  From 1797 – 1807, the proportion of Spain’s income from 
illegal to legal exports from the colonies was over 0.75 to 1.32  
c. The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade 
North American merchants became permanently involved in significant business 
relations in Spain and her colonies during wartime for both Spain and America.33  In 1798, 
America had entered the Quasi-War with France, and Spain was at war with England and France 
during the latter part of the eighteenth century in an effort to regain status as a world power.34  
The years from 1793 to 1808 were a period of unprecedented prosperity for United States 
farmers and merchants as military suppliers to Spain.35  Beginning in 1779, British naval 
blockades crippled Spanish delivery of supplies to the colonies, leading Spain to have to allow 
American colonies to trade with Cuba.36  This went against the pervading Spanish economic 
policy of mercantilism which restricted trade with foreign nations in favor of monopolies on 
supplies and food heavily taxed by the Crown.37   
Tobacco was the primary American agricultural export during the colonial period when 
exports to England peaked at 100 million pounds in 1776.38  There was a demand for tobacco in 
America because early British settlers were accustomed and likely addicted to using tobacco in 
England.  Native Americans had their own tobacco habit, but smoked a different type of tobacco, 
                                                     
31 Javier Cuenca-Esteban, Statistics of Spain’s Colonial Trade 1747 – 1820: New Estimates and Comparisons with 
Great Britain, 26 J. IBERIAN AND LATIN AM. ECON. HIST. 323, Table 3 (2008). 
32 Id. 
33 Harold A. Bierck, supra note 6 at 493. 
34 Id. at 490. 
35 Javier Cuenca Esteban, Trends and Cycles in U.S. Trade with Spain and the Spanish Empire, 1790 – 1819, 44 J. 
ECON. HIST. 521, 521 (1984). 
36 Roy F. Nichols, supra note 7 at 293. 
37 See, e.g., id. at 290. 
38 Stuart Allan, A Marketing History of the U.S. Tobacco Industry: From Colonial Times to the Great Depression, 
Florida Atlantic University (1995), 
http://faculty.quinnipiac.edu/charm/CHARM%20proceedings/CHARM%20article%20archive%20pdf%20format/V
olume%207%201995/237%20alan.pdf.  
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which English settlers found too harsh compared to Spanish tobacco.39  In the early seventeenth 
century, Spain enjoyed a monopoly on tobacco, and strong anti-Spanish sentiment among British 
settlers led them to risk their lives to smuggle seeds into the United States and grow their own 
tobacco rather than patronize the Spanish crown.40   
Tobacco, known colloquially as sotweed,41 was the colonies’ principal export during the 
colonial period, and its production was concentrated in the Chesapeake tidewater region where 
the crop grew abundantly.42  In Maryland and Virginia around the Potomac River, planters grew 
a common variety of tobacco called orinoco.43  In the Chesapeake during the seventeenth 
century, ninety percent of exports to Great Britain were tobacco, accounting for half of total 
colonial exports to the home country.44  After John Rolfe first planted tobacco in Jamestown 
which he smuggled from Venezuela, production exploded from 2,300 pounds in 1615 to 500,000 
pounds 1620 and over 15 million pounds in 1670.45  This enormous supply went directly to 
England, because just as Spain had with her colonies, England imposed a policy of mercantilism 
on exports from the American colonies prior to the Revolution.46   
However, British consumers were far from being the only end purchasers of Chesapeake 
tobacco.47  In the latter part of the eighteenth century, eighty-five percent of Chesapeake tobacco 
shipped to England was re-exported to Holland, Germany and France.48  Chesapeake tobacco 
                                                     
39 Chesapeake Bay, The Colonial Period, 1607–1780, Mariner’s Museum, 2002 
http://www.marinersmuseum.org/sites/micro/cbhf/economy/cbe001.html. 
40 Stuart Allen, supra note 38 at 240. 
41 Henry Miller, The Lure of Sotweed: Tobacco and Maryland History, 
http://www.hsmcdigshistory.org/pdf/Tobacco.pdf.  
42 Gene Borio, Economic Aspects of Tobacco during the Colonial Period 1612–1776, 
http://archive.tobacco.org/History/colonialtobacco.html.  
43 Lorena S. Walsh, Plantation Management in the Chesapeake, 1620-1820, J. ECON. HIST., 396 (1989). 
44 Jacob M. Price, The Economic Growth of the Chesapeake and the European Market, 1697-1775, J. ECON. HIST., 
496 (1964). 
45 Miller supra note 41; Price supra note 44 at 497. 
46 Miller supra note 41. 
47 Price supra note 44 at 499. 
48 Id. 
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was cheaper than tobacco grown in the Spanish colonies, likely because of the significant taxes 
levied by the Spanish crown’s tobacco monopoly.49  Regarding France in particular, it seems 
unlikely that the French would be involved in trading with Great Britain during a period in which 
the two countries fought seven wars and imposed economic pressure on one another through 
exclusionary trading practices.50  Nevertheless, it is possible if not likely that in times of peace 
and in times of war, leading right up to the time of Barry’s transaction with Manella, much of the 
tobacco used in France originated in the Chesapeake.   
This could have happened in two ways.  During times of war, proceeds from French 
privateers capturing ships laded with Chesapeake tobacco were enough to meet the full supply of 
the French tobacco monopoly without having to trade with England.51  This occurred in the early 
part of the seventeenth century, and shows that Chesapeake tobacco was specifically sought by 
French privateers like those who captured the Minerva in Manella v. Barry.52  During peace 
time, French trade with England was open, and France operated a monopoly on tobacco through 
John Law’s Company of the Indies.53  Until 1744 imported enough tobacco to become the largest 
re-export market in the world for Chesapeake tobacco.54  It is worth noting that James Barry had 
business ties with Thomas Law’s East India Trading Company from his time living in India.55  
Though this was after John Law’s time, Barry’s mercantile involvement with the Law family 
was likely a factor that led to the growth of his business, establishing him as a merchant in the 
Chesapeake with enough capacity and influence to satisfy an order as large as Manella’s.  
                                                     
49 See id at 500. 
50 Id. at 501. 
51 Price supra note 44 at 524. 
52 See chart on p.15 and text accompanying note 112. 
53 Price supra note 44 at 524. 
54 Id. at 505. 
55 See infra notes 253–254 and accompanying text. 
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Beyond being a source of revenue from exports to England, tobacco was of great 
importance domestically.  The cash crop served as a form of currency and taxation in the 
Chesapeake when gold and silver were scarce.56  Taxes on tobacco were also a principal source 
of government revenue in Maryland, yielding $3,784 per year in 1700.57  The principal 
challenges with tobacco cultivation were the significant labor necessary for cultivation and the 
exhaustion of a piece of land after three years of growing tobacco.58  These factors led Maryland 
tobacco farmers to invest heavily in slaves and exploit land owned by Native Americans.59  
These challenges also meant that plantation owners in Maryland and Virginia combined tobacco 
cultivation with grain and wheat farming, which rose throughout the Chesapeake region 
beginning in 1730.60  
 
                                                     
56 Miller supra note 41. 
57 Id. 
58 Price supra note 44 at 511. 
59 Id. (“In some areas slave populations grew from 7% to 35% of the Chesapeake regions’ population between 1690 
– 1750.”); see also Lorena S. Walsh, Plantation Management in the Chesapeake, 1620-1820, J. ECON. HIST., 393 
(1989). 
60 Walsh supra note 43 at 397. 
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61 
The first Maryland tobacco farms were organized around the Potomac river in Southern 
Maryland.62  After the Revolution, tobacco production in the state moved westward, but never 
matched the scope of early production in Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles, Prince George’s and 
St. Mary’s counties.63  During the colonial period, Catholic families established the state of 
Maryland as a whole, and these counties in particular, as a haven where Catholics coming from 
England could find religious toleration.64  George Calvert, a Catholic and the first Lord 
Baltimore, named the state and St. Mary’s County for the Catholic queen Henrietta Maria, wife 
                                                     
61 Map of Southern Maryland counties initially involved in tobacco farming, National Register of Historic Places, 
United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, 3 (2002), 
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
l.pdf.  
62 National Register of Historic Places, United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, 1 (2002), 
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
l.pdf. 
63 Id. at 2. 
64 New Advent, Catholic Encyclopedia, Archdiocese of Baltimore, Colonial Period, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02228a.htm.  
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of Charles I of England.65  Accordingly, land ownership in these counties was dominated by 
Catholic families.  These included the influential family of Daniel Carroll, whose  nephew 
Charles Carroll of Carrollton signed the Declaration of Independence.66  Daniel Carroll’s own 
sons also enjoyed prominence, including John Carroll who was named the first Roman Catholic 
bishop in the United States as Archbishop of Baltimore in 1790.67  A close friend of James 
Barry’s, Bishop John Carroll introduced Barry to the Spanish consuls with whom he initially did 
business.68  This introduction eventually led to Barry’s involvement in the transaction at issue in 
Manella v. Barry.69 
70 
 
Three factors during the eighteenth century impacted tobacco production in the 
Chesapeake and the avenues through which the crop was sold: the Tobacco Inspection Acts of 
                                                     
65 Id. 
66 See e.g., Signers of the Declaration of Independence, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/signers/carroll.htm. 
67 J. THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF MARYLAND, VOL. II, History of Maryland, 220 (Tradition Press, 1967). 
68 See infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. 
69 Id. 
70 Tobacco barn in Prince Frederick, Calvert County, Maryland, National Register of Historic Places, United States 
Department of the Interior National Park Service, 66 (2002), 
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
l.pdf. 
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1747, the American Revolution, and the growth of local urban markets.71  When issues with 
comparative tobacco quality arose and demand from England decreased, Virginia and Maryland 
passed Inspection Acts which required all tobacco being exported to pass through a central 
warehouse where the tobacco could be inspected.72  This led to steadily increasing revenues for 
tobacco farmers up until the American Revolution, and the concentration of tobacco farming in 
large plantations which could absorb the increased costs associated with meeting quality 
requirements.73  The inspection warehouse system also allowed for faster international shipping 
times and better packaging to preclude spoilage during overseas shipments.74   
During the Revolution, the Chesapeake experienced an economic depression as many 
planters were called to military service and plantations experienced debilitating losses from 
British raids.75  Following the Revolution, the Chesapeake tobacco market carried more risk than 
in the early seventeenth century when farmers could depend on high demand from British 
importers.76  Price fluctuation and falling land prices were common post-Revolution challenges 
which contributed to the concentration of tobacco farming in larger producers, many from 
western Maryland.77  With the concentration of production in fewer growers also came greater 
control of the tobacco market by domestic merchants.  No longer did British mercantilism 
control the destiny of Chesapeake tobacco, rather marketing was left to international sales 
through businessmen with existing trading networks such as James Barry.78  In addition, after the 
Revolution, tobacco growing areas expanded beyond the Chesapeake tidewater region, moving 
                                                     
71 See Walsh supra note 43 at 401. 
72 Mary McKinney Schweitzer, Economic Regulation and the Colonial Economy: The Maryland Tobacco Inspection 
Act of 1747, J. ECON. HIST., 566 (1980). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 565. 
75 Id. 
76 Walsh supra note 43 at 401. 
77 Id. 
78 See infra Part VII. 
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to the west and south.79  These regions produced different types of tobacco, allowing Maryland 
and Virginia plantations to accommodate changing tastes in the European market for stronger 
flavored tobacco.80 
The expansion of tobacco plantations beyond the tidewater region was one factor that led 
to the rise of “fall line towns” along the Chesapeake such as Baltimore.81  The topography of the 
tidewater and piedmont waterways prohibited ships from passing further inland than the fall line 
boundary.82  The earliest Chesapeake planters established tobacco plantations inside of the fall 
line where they had ocean access and could ship tobacco directly to England.83  Once plantations 
expanded beyond the fall lines, growers set up warehouses and shipping centers at the fall lines 
of the westward flowing rivers so that they had access to waterways for transporting their 
exports.84  This development along the fall line eventually grew into towns including Baltimore, 
Georgetown and Richmond.85  Therefore, by 1798, large shipments of tobacco such as Barry’s 
would have been sent from Baltimore or other fall line towns rather than directly from the 
individual planters who sourced the tobacco. 
In addition, increased populations in these towns established urban markets for 
agricultural goods, and increased transportation of cargo by road and water further concentrated 
agricultural exports in industrialized cities like Baltimore.  One factor adding to the 
industrialization of Baltimore was the growth of the export market for flour.  In the late 
eighteenth century, grain became a focus for Maryland planters responding to increased foreign 
                                                     
79 National Register of Historic Places, United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, 13 (2002), 
http://www.preservationmaryland.org/uploads/file/Tobacco%20Barns/SoMD%20Tobacco%20Barns%20MPD_Fina
l.pdf. 
80 Id. 
81 ARTHUR PIERCE MIDDLETON, TOBACCO COAST: A MARITIME HISTORY OF CHESAPEAKE BAY IN THE COLONIAL 
ERA 49 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). 
82 Id. at 48. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 49. 
85 Id. 
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demand for flour and easy cultivation in coastal soils.86  Flour mills were then concentrated in 
industrialized centers, coinciding with growth in population and commerce in Baltimore from 
1790 – 1812.87  Additionally, by 1810 road systems to Baltimore had improved, decreasing 
shipping times.88  This meant that local planters could more easily meet the demand for 
perishable goods coming from new populations in urban centers.89  Thus, with increased 
industrialization from the milling industry and an increase in overall population, Baltimore 
became a major shipping center for the Chesapeake region, eventually becoming the third largest 
port city in the union.90 
 91 
II. NARRATIVE OF THE FACTS 
A large international purchase of American tobacco began the conflict between plaintiff 
Manella, Pujals & Co., and defendant James Barry.  Manella, a Spanish merchant, sought to 
                                                     
86 See, e.g., Pearle Blood, Factors in the Economic Development of Baltimore, Maryland, ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, 
189 (1937). 
87 Id. 
88 Jo N. Hays, Overlapping Hinterlands: York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, 1800-1850, PENN. MAG. OF HIST. AND 
BIOG., 301 (1992). 
89 Walsh supra note 43 at 401. 
90 See, e.g., Ruthella Mory Bibbins, The City of Baltimore, 1797 – 1850, in BALTIMORE: ITS HISTORY AND ITS 
PEOPLE 6, 63 (Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1912). 
91 Maryland and Virginia were the primary American producers of tobacco in the nineteenth century. This image 
portrays tobacco farming in Maryland (https://dutchpipesmoker.wordpress.com/2013/04/). 
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purchase 1,528 hogsheads of American tobacco, a quantity worth over $2.7 million dollars 
today.92  At the time, the Spanish Crown operated a monopoly on the tobacco market, and only 
sold Venezuelan tobacco.93  In 1798 at the time of this transaction, Spain had reentered the 
French Revolution as a French ally, following a one year period of neutrality prior to which 
Spain was engaged in the war on the British side.94  Because of the threat of British and French 
privateering in West Indian waters,95 Spain had to procure tobacco from a neutral party.  The 
entire transaction between Manella and Barry occurred because America was a neutral party at 
the time of the transaction, and the tobacco could be shipped without threat of seizure by an 
enemy vessel.  However, America’s neutral status at sea was short lived because by the summer 
of 1798, the same year the transaction with Manella was initiated, America was engaged in the 
Quasi-War with France and subject to attacks by French privateers on its merchant ships. 
 96   97 
                                                     
92 Calculation of $204,077.77 in today’s dollars using the Inflation Calculator, 
http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi.  
93 Harold A. Bierck, supra note 9 at 490. 
94 Roy F. Nichols, supra note 7 at 295.  
95 Id. at 293. 
96 Tobacco was shipped in a wooden barrel called a hogshead, shown in this image. A hogshead could hold up to 
1,000 pounds of tobacco ( http://amhistory.si.edu/onthewater/exhibition/1_3.html). 
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To facilitate the tobacco purchase, Manella’s associate, Bernardo Lacosta,98 wrote a letter 
in Spanish to his American contact James Barry asking him to secure and ship the tobacco under 
Barry’s name.  Barry was to be paid a five percent commission.  This type of business contact 
between Spanish and North American merchant friends who had previously done business 
together was typical of trade networks of the time period given the trade restrictions that 
existed.99  James Barry had experience doing business with Spanish merchants, beginning with 
his introduction to Spanish diplomats Joséf de Jaudénes, Marqués de Casa Irujo, and José 
Ignazio Viar by Bishop John Carroll in the 1790’s.100  This trading relationship began because 
Barry was able to supply flour on credit to Spain when it could not satisfy the demand from 
Puerto Rico, a Spanish colony at the time.101   
102 
In his letter to Barry of January 27, 1798, Bernardo Lacosta clarified Juan Alonzo 
Menedez Conde’s (Menendez) role in the transaction, writing that “Mr. Conde goes to Baltimore 
                                                                                                                                                                           
97 The tobacco was pressed into the hogshead by plantation workers, sometimes slaves, who would pile the dried 
leaves into the barrel and use a lever to compress the tobacco 
(http://amhistory.si.edu/onthewater/exhibition/1_3.html). 
98 The case papers refer to this man as Bernardo Lacosta, but other sources refer to him as Bernardo La Costa. 
99 Perrone, Sean, supra note 16 at 79. 
100 Linda K. Salvucci, supra note 23 at 129.  
101 See infra Part VII.A. 
102 Portrait of Marqués de Casa Irujo by Gilbert Stuart, from Linda K. Salvucci, Merchants and Diplomats: 
Philadelphia’s Early Trade with Cuba, 3 PENNSYLVANIA LEGACIES 6, 8 (2003). 
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as agent103 of the house of Messrs. Manella, Pujals & Co. of this place, principally interested in 
the importation of tobacco for this kingdom.”104  The letter enumerated in eleven points exactly 
how the tobacco was to be shipped: in six to eight vessels, with American captains and with a 
bill of lading and other papers in James Barry’s name.105  Included in the ships’ papers was to be 
a letter from Barry stating that the tobacco was consigned to Lacosta, Manella, and one other 
firm in Cadíz.  Lacosta also stipulated that if the crown would not let the tobacco be unloaded at 
Cádiz, the ships were to proceed to Genoa.106  This suggests that Barry’s tobacco was to be sold 
as contraband since there were instructions from Manella about what to do should the tobacco be 
restricted from entering Spain at Cádiz.  The fifth point indicated that there should be two sets of 
papers aboard each ship, one showing that the vessel was destined for Cadíz, and one for 
Geonoa.107  Additionally, Lacosta wrote that the tobacco should not be shipped at more than ten 
dollars per quintal, but that if none was available at that price, Barry could consult with 
Menendez about whether they need to go over this price by $0.25 or $0.50 so as to prevent 
delay.108  Furthermore, Lacosta directed Barry to draw on creditors from Hamburg, London, 
Amsterdam, and Lisbon.109  Lacosta also wrote in this letter, “I refer you to the verbal 
communication of the bearer of this subject who is sent on purpose to superintend the 
shipment.”110  Menendez delivered the letter to Barry on March 22, 1798, and shortly thereafter 
Barry began to ship the tobacco.  
In accordance with Lacosta’s instructions, Barry shipped the tobacco to Cadíz as follows: 
                                                     
103 The word ‘agent’ was underlined in the circuit court record. 
104 Manella, Pujals, and Co. v. James Barry, 7 U.S. 415, 416 (1806). 
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Shipping 
Date 
Vessel 
Name 
Vessel 
Nationality 
Hogsheads 
of Tobacco 
Value of 
Tobacco ($) 
Shipped To Shipped on 
Account of 
April 28, 
1798 
Muqueni Moorish 62 8,846.36 Messrs. Gahn 
& Co. 
James 
Barry 
May 18, 
1798 
Minerva Danish 270 27,868.35 Messrs. Pablo, 
Greppi, 
Marliani & Co. 
James 
Barry 
May 26, 
1798 
Polly and 
Nancy 
American 500 60,914.56 Bernardo 
Lacosta 
James 
Barry 
July 10, 
1798 
Felicity American 100 13,876.48 Messrs. Gahn 
& Co. 
Don Carlos 
Longhy 
July 23, 
1798 
Susanna American 117 17,269.77 Messrs. Pablo, 
Greppi, 
Marliani & Co. 
Don Carlos 
Longhy 
August 16, 
1798 
Henrietta American 288 43,064.54 Bernardo 
Lacosta 
Don Carlos 
Longhy 
November 
8, 1798 
Fly American 191  Bernardo 
Lacosta 
James 
Barry 
 
Of the seven ships sent for Cadíz, the British captured the Muqueni and Henrietta and the French 
captured the Minerva.111  Four out of seven ships arrived safely at their destination.112  At trial, 
both sides agreed that Menendez was present when Barry chartered the Moorish and Danish 
ships, and that Menendez approved those vessels because they were of neutral nationality and 
American vessels were not available.113  In giving his verbal approval, Menendez showed Robert 
Barry, nephew and business associate of James Barry, a letter written in Spanish authorizing the 
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verbal instructions.114  In two letters dated May 28th and 29th, 1798, Menendez wrote to Barry 
confirming the shipments.115   
Menendez wrote again to Barry on June 14, 1798, expressing concern over America’s 
entry into war with France and the attendant loss of neutrality status.116  Menendez had left 
America to return to Spain on June 4, 1798 from Alexandria.117  In this letter, Menendez directed 
the remainder of the shipments to be made on Danish or Swedish vessels to Messrs. Pablo, 
Greppi, Marliani & Co., with papers in the name of Charles Longhy of Genoa stating explicitly 
that Barry is acting as Longhy’s agent.118  Menendez included in letters to Messrs. Pablo, 
Greppi, Marliani & Co. that a letter should accompany the shipments of cargo for the sole 
purpose of explicating the agency relationship between Barry and Longhy.119  Additionally, 
Menendez provided instructions for making the shipments on American vessels in case Barry 
had already chartered them.120  In this scenario as well, Menendez took pains to ensure that the 
cargo was safe from capture by the French, even if the vessel itself was taken by a French 
privateer.  Barry received this letter before the shipment on the Henrietta was made.121  
Menendez’s concerns came to fruition when the British captured the Henrietta.   
On the same day, Menendez also wrote to Robert Barry, stating that there were to be two 
separate invoices accompanying the cargo.122  One invoice was to be sent and charged to 
Bernardo Lacosta with a $2.50 per quintal overcharge, and one with the real costs was to be sent 
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to Mr. Joseph Anthony de Sola, administrator of the king’s tobacco stores in Cadíz.123  De Sola 
was also to receive a copy of the invoice with the overcharges sent to Lacosta.124 
To recover for the cargo lost at sea to the French and British, Manella sued in the Circuit 
Court of Maryland for an initial sum of $100,000, the amount Manella had advanced to Barry to 
ship the tobacco.125  Manella’s claim was of trespass on the case, a catchall tort used at the time 
to recover damages resulting indirectly from the defendant’s actions.126  The amount claimed 
was later amended to $200,000 after Barry failed to appear in court.127  It is likely that Barry did 
not appear in court because he was outside the court’s jurisdiction.  In 1800 at the time of his 
trial, Barry had moved to Washington, D.C. and later moved to New York.128  In Barry’s 
absence, court marshal David Hopkins called Barry’s nephew Robert Barry and Hugh Thompson 
to appear in court on James Barry’s behalf on May 7, 1801.129  Attorneys Robert Goodloe Harper 
and John Purviance represented Manella, and Walter Dorsey, Luther Martin, and William 
Pinkney represented Barry.130  A Petit Jury of twenty before Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth 
found for Barry, awarding $18 in court costs on May 1, 1805.131  
Manella appealed, filing a writ of error with the Supreme Court with two bills of 
exceptions.132  The first contested the translation of the phrase “para presenter la expedición” in 
Lacosta’s letter of January 27, 1798.133  Manella argued that this phrase meant “to be present at, 
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or assist in, the shipments” as opposed to the translation used in the Circuit Court case papers, 
“to superintend the shipments.”134  In the second bill of exceptions, Manella argued that the firm 
was entitled to recover from Barry the value of the cargo on the three ships that were captured, 
plus the price of tobacco on those vessels above what was stipulated in Lacosta’s written 
instructions, because Barry had incorrectly relied on Menendez’s verbal instructions. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
a. Legal Background 
Maritime prize doctrine governed the high seas during the Quasi-War between the United 
States and France.135  In wartime, privateers from belligerent nations could capture merchant 
ships of the enemy at sea and lawfully take the vessel, cargo, or both.136  Privateering was 
valuable both to the privateer crews themselves and to their sovereign states.  The privateers 
stood to earn the full financial value of the capture, and the sovereign states benefitted from the 
crippling effect privateers had on the war effort of enemy nations.137  American privateers had a 
significant impact on enemy nations, capturing 2,500 British merchant ships during the War of 
1812.138  These merchant ships were often carrying cargo to supply troops with provisions and 
munitions, so their capture meant a setback on the ground as well. 
With prize law governing the high seas during the time of the tobacco shipment in 
Manella v. Barry, the capture of Barry’s three ships was both unsurprising and most likely legal.  
Lacosta’s instructions to ship the cargo under a neutral name indicated that Lacosta knew of the 
risk of seizure at sea.  Consistent with Lacosta’s premonition, French privateers captured the 
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Muqueni and Minerva, neutral Moorish and Danish vessels, chartered under James Barry’s 
American name.  As long as the French captured these vessels after the United States’ entry into 
the Quasi-War with France in summer of 1798, this was lawful prize taking.  Even though the 
vessels were neutral, the cargo was laded in James Barry’s name, so it would have been enemy 
cargo subject to seizure.   
Later, the British captured the Henrietta, an American vessel with cargo shipped to 
Bernardo Lacosta in Spain on account of Don Carlos Longhy of Genoa, Italy.  There are several 
reasons why the British might have captured this vessel, even though during the Quasi-War with 
France, the U.S. and Great Britain were allied against France.  The law of nations stipulated that 
a country at war had the right to confiscate property of the enemy wherever found, but not the 
property of an ally.139  With regard to neutral vessels, the law stated that “[a] belligerent [could] 
arrest a neutral vessel on the high seas for any breach of neutrality.”140  Thus, the Henrietta was 
probably not captured because it was American but because its cargo was headed for Spain, 
which was allied with France against Great Britain in the war.  The captors would have initially 
reviewed the sets of papers on board the Henrietta, and discovered that the tobacco was destined 
for Spain to be sold to Spanish merchant, Bernardo Lacosta.  Shipping and admiralty law 
allowed the likely use of an article to be inferred from its destination.141  Additionally, 
“[p]roperty belonging to a merchant residing at an enemy’s port is liable to condemnation.”142  
Finally, the origin of the property could give it hostile character.143  For all of these reasons, the 
Henrietta was vulnerable to British privateers because it was American tobacco destined for a 
Spanish port to be sold to a Spanish merchant. 
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The tobacco on board all seven ships sent by Barry was also subject to seizure at sea 
under the law of nations because of the fraudulent papers on board each ship.  Shipping and 
admiralty law included a penalty for carrying contraband goods.144  All of the tobacco in 
Manella v. Pujals was contraband because at the time as there was a royal monopoly on tobacco 
in Spain which sourced its tobacco exclusively from Venezuela.145  The ships were also subject 
to seizure because where the owner knows about a fraudulent transaction and a ship carrying 
goods under false papers, the vessel itself and its cargo will be considered lawful prize.146  
Lacosta and Menendez’s letters about shipping the cargo under neutral cover indicates that they 
were aware that Barry’s ships were subject to seizure. 
In addition to prize law, the law of agency was the basis for the holding in Manella, and 
is rooted in the English common law of contracts. 147  As early as 1389, British courts recognized 
agency relationships in the mercantile context, holding that a principal was liable for the failure 
of his apprentice to remit payment.148  By the 17th and 18th centuries, the word “agent” came 
into use, and the law of agency became an official part of English common law under Chief 
Justice Holt of the English Court of Chancery.149  Chief Justice Holt looked to rules followed in 
admiralty law with regard to ship owners, masters and merchants to establish the common law 
rules of agency.150  In issuing his holding in Manella a century later, Chief Justice Marshall 
asserted that it was an established point of law that an agent must act in furtherance of the 
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principal’s interests.151  This is still true today, as agency relationships are a ubiquitous part of 
doing business in the modern world.152  Rather, the issue in Manella was whether the third 
party’s deviation from the instructions of an agent were justified.153 
In the arguments for the appellant, there was a discussion of the difference between 
specific and general agency, and whether that distinction established that Barry should not have 
relied on Menendez’s instructions.154  The law on specific and general agency stipulates that the 
entire series of transactions described in Lacosta’s January letter to Barry would have been an 
instance of specific agency because it did not involve a continuity of service.155  Chief Justice 
Marshall did not entertain this distinction, but if he did, the entire shipment of tobacco in the 
seven vessels would likely have been considered one series of transactions, which a specific 
agent is legally authorized to oversee.   
 
b. The Arguments 
Manella’s appeal reached the Supreme Court on February 4, 1806 after five years in the 
Circuit Court system.156  Representing Manella, Robert Goodloe Harper raised two issues: 1) 
whether Barry had deviated from Lacosta’s written instructions and 2) whether Barry was 
justified to deviate from the letter by Menendez’s direction.157  On the first question, Harper 
focused on the shipment of goods in non-American ships, and the shipment on the Henrietta 
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which was not in James Barry’s own name, but in the name of Carlos Longhy of Genoa.158  On 
the second question, Harper focused on Lacosta’s letter of January 27, 1798 which gave explicit 
direction about the shipment, including the price of the tobacco.159   
Harper argued that Barry was not justified in substituting his judgment for Manella’s 
because Lacosta’s instructions were explicit.  Further, there was no justification to rely on 
Menendez’s direction because there was no evidence to support his role as Manella’s agent.160  If 
there was any agency relationship between Menendez and Manella, it was one of specific and not 
general agency.161  Harper further argued that the correct translation of the phrase “para 
presentaiar la expedición” allowed Menendez to communicate with Barry about the shipment 
only in accordance with the written instructions, not to control the enterprise as a whole.162  
Harper even alluded in the Supreme Court minutes that Menendez’s testimony was the evidence 
necessary, and perhaps he was being kept away in Spain.163   
Representing Barry, attorneys William Pinkney and Luther Martin, began by engendering 
doubt in the Court as to Manella’s integrity based on the fraudulent double sets of papers aboard 
each ship and the explicit attempt to evade the Spanish government by shipping in neutral 
vessels.164  Unlike Manella’s attorneys, Pinkney and Martin focused their argument around 
Manella’s three claims: 1) the excess in price above the instructions 2) the cargo shipped in 
Moorish and Danish vessels and 3) the Henrietta’s cargo.165  As to the shipment in Moorish and 
Danish vessels, Pinkney and Martin argued that the goods were to be shipped in neutral ships, 
and with America entering into the Quasi-War with France in the midst of the shipments, the 
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cargo is no more safe in American ships than in neutral ships generally.166  Additionally, there 
was no way for Lacosta to know whether Barry would be able to find six or more American 
ships for this purpose, so it wouldn’t make sense for the foreign merchant to require this in its 
instructions.167  The arguments for the defendant closed by highlighting that the shipments on the 
Moorish and Danish vessels were made in the same manner as those on the Felicity and Susanna, 
both of which arrived safely at their destination.168 
The argument around the shipment on the Henrietta also centered on America’s loss of 
neutrality status at the time.  Pinkney and Martin stressed that the whole point of Barry shipping 
the goods in his name was because Barry was a neutral party at the time Lacosta wrote his letter.  
Six months later, Barry’s American name was no longer neutral, constituting a material change 
in circumstances.169  In carrying out Lacosta’s instructions as to the shipment, Barry was bound 
to trust Menendez regarding any ambiguity.  Menendez’s verbal instructions were reasonably in 
furtherance of the enterprise as a whole, and there was no evidence that he had acted 
fraudulently.170  As to the question about why Menendez’s testimony has not been brought to 
court, Martin and Pinkney answered that they sent a commission to Spain to examine Menendez, 
but were unsuccessful.171  The time taken to seek out Menendez could have been a factor in 
Manella’s case languishing in court as long as it did.  Martin and Pinkney asked in response why 
the attorneys for Manella did not seek out Menendez to sue him rather than Barry.172  This was 
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likely because Menendez did not have a substantial fortune worth seeking in suit, or because it 
would have been too hard to bring him in for litigation.173   
In response, attorney Philip Barton Key focused on Barry and Menendez’s limited 
authority regarding the details of the shipment.  He did not address America’s loss of neutrality 
status during the time of the seven shipments, and stressed that the letter required the cargo to be 
shipped in American vessels only.  Key argued that Menendez had no authority to deviate from 
Lacosta’s instructions.174 
c. The Decision 
On February 26, 1806, Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.  
Marshall distilled the issue in the case down to whether Barry deviated from Lacosta’s 
instructions.175  Marshall highlighted that Lacosta’s letter directed Barry to refer to Menendez’s 
verbal instructions because Menendez was sent to superintend the shipment.  The Chief Justice 
referenced the evidence that, upon dispatching the Moorish and Danish vessels, Menendez 
approved these shipments since American vessels were not available and America had lost 
neutrality status.176  The Court finds that this was a fair interpretation of Lacosta’s letter given 
the circumstances, and that Barry was bound to comply with Menendez’s direction.  Further, 
Marshall wrote that the letter was a communication to Barry of instructions from Lacosta to 
Menendez, not instructions from Lacosta directly to Barry.177  That Barry could have declined to 
fulfill the fraudulent transaction entirely, as many American merchants had done, further 
supported Menendez’s power to superintend the shipments.178  “[I]t seems to the court perfectly 
                                                     
173 See Eric Rasmsen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, Discussion Paper No. 323, Harvard Law School (2001) 
(http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/323.pdf). 
174 Manella, 7 U.S. at 438–39. 
175 Id. at 439. 
176 Id. at 440. 
177 Id. at 442. 
178 Id. at 442; see also note 27 and accompanying text.  
30 
 
clear, that with respect to the tobacco shipped in the Moorish and Danish vessels, the conduct of 
the defendant, being sanctioned by Menendez, was free from all exception.”179 
The Court viewed Manella’s claim for the value of cargo shipped on the Henrietta as a 
stronger claim.180  The evidence showed that Barry deviated from the explicit written directions 
to ship the goods in his own name, but in defense Barry argued that he justifiably relied on 
Menendez’s verbal instructions.181 The Court agreed.182  Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that 
Lacosta’s letter referenced Menendez’s verbal instructions and his role as agent of the 
principal,183 giving Menendez the right to exercise discretion as to the shipment.184  Furthermore, 
all of Menendez’s decisions that deviated from the written instructions in Lacosta’s letter were 
reasonable given America’s loss of neutrality status during the course of the shipments.185  
Therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. 
d. Analysis 
The issue in Manella as defined by Chief Justice John Marshall was whether James Barry 
deviated from Menendez’s instructions.186  Barry’s alleged deviation with respect to the three 
captured ships was that the cargo was shipped on Moorish and Danish vessels instead of 
American vessels, and on account of Bernardo Lacosta instead of in his own name.  Given 
America’s loss of neutrality status during the process of shipping the tobacco and the nature of 
international trade in the eighteenth century, Chief Justice John Marshall correctly affirmed the 
lower court’s decision.  James Barry rightfully relied on Menendez’s instructions, even though 
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the instructions deviated from Lacosta’s written instructions in the letter of January 27, 1798.  
Thus, Barry was not liable to Manella for the price of the lost cargo. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning rested largely on the change in circumstances between 
the date of Lacosta’s letter and each vessel’s shipping date.  The United States’ entry into Quasi-
War with France meant that Barry would have put Manella at risk if Barry insisted on following 
precisely the instructions in Lacosta’s initial letter.  What’s more, this would have been 
unreasonable because Menendez was sent as Manella’s agent to “superintend the shipment.”  
Regardless of how those words are construed, common sense dictates that Menendez and Barry 
had to decide how best to ship the cargo so as to ensure safe passage.  After all, Manella and 
Lacosta were an ocean away from Baltimore when the ships were being dispatched.  Because of 
the challenges inherent to international trade at this time, agents were sent to make decisions 
exactly like those Menendez made.  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, all of Menendez’s 
decisions and all of Barry’s actions were reasonable given the change in circumstances, and were 
in furtherance of Manella’s best interests in the enterprise as a whole. 
The rule in Manella is that a factor transacting with a principal through an agent is 
justified in relying on the agent’s instructions if those instructions are reasonably in furtherance 
of the principal’s interest, even if they conflict with the principal’s written instructions.  This rule 
still holds today, but one can imagine the string of emails and cell phone calls which would be 
made between the principal and agent to confirm a change such as the one made by Menendez.  
In 1798, these modes of instant communication were unavailable, necessitating the use of agents 
to effectuate international trade deals.  By virtue of his charge as agent to act in the best interests 
of his principals, Menendez’s changes to the original instructions were reasonable, and Barry 
was justified in relying on them. 
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IV. EFFECT OF THE DECISION 
Manella v. Barry is still good law and is relevant enough to have been cited by secondary 
sources as recently as 2014.  A Legal Encyclopedia update from 2014 cites to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Manella in Section III, Rights and Duties as Between a Factor and Principal.  
If the factor is referred to a general agent of the principal, the duty of a factor or agent is to obey 
instructions by a principal, and the factor may justifiably obey orders of the agent, even if they 
conflict with written instructions from the principal.187 
Manella has also been cited as a part of the evolution of the contra proferentem doctrine 
of contract interpretation.  Appleman’s treatise on Insurance Law includes the case in its 
description of this doctrine.188  Contra proferentem originated in English common law and was 
described by Sir Francis Bacon as a rule stating “that a man’s deeds and his words shall be taken 
strongliest [sic] against himself” and which is “one of the most common grounds of the law.”189  
The Virginia Supreme Court cited this maxim in 1794.190  Historically, contra proferentem was a 
last resort doctrine whereby ambiguous contracts were construed “against the drafter” only 
where a tie-breaker was necessary.191   
Manella is an example of an early American case where the contra proferentem doctrine 
was applied to a business transaction done across a great distance.  The distance made 
negotiations impossible, so the burden of clarity was on the contract drafter.192  In Manella, the 
ambiguity arose in Menendez’s letters subsequent to Lacosta’s letter of January 27, 1798, the 
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only one in which Lacosta specified his instructions.  Menendez’s subsequent verbal instructions 
to James and Robert Barry compounded the ambiguity of the letters.  The Supreme Court found 
that Lacosta’s instructions to Barry did not require him to send the tobacco in American vessels, 
only that the vessels be neutral.  This broad construction of Lacosta’s letter is an example of 
construing ambiguity against the drafter of a business agreement based on the contra proferentem 
doctrine.  
Additionally, Manella is cited as an example of Supreme Court references to Muslims, 
for the description of the Moorish ship Muqueni which the British captured while en route to 
Cadíz.193 
The case law that followed Manella cites the case primarily with regard to agency law.194  
There are cases referencing Manella from 1805 to 1891 ranging from a common pleas court up 
to the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, all of which reinforced its holding.195  Manella’s 
holding is cited in an 1891 case from the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania for the rule of 
agency law that an agent who departs from the instructions of his principal assumes the risk of 
loss.196  The Supreme Court of Ohio cited Manella in holding that an accredited agent must act 
with fidelity to his copartners.197  The Supreme Court of Missouri cited Manella in 1870 as the 
strongest authority establishing the proposition that an agent must act in conformity with his 
instructions.198  The Supreme Court of Florida cited Manella in an 1850 decision related to 
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agency law, supporting the proposition that an agent has a duty to pursue the orders of his 
principal to the best of his ability.199 
Manella has also been referenced as authority for the evidence through which an agency 
relationship may be established.  In Page v. Lathrop, the Missouri Supreme Court cited Manella 
to support the proposition that an agency relationship need not be established directly on a bill 
sent to a creditor.200  The evidence in Manella of Menendez’s status as agent came from 
Lacosta’s January 1798 letter, and was not noted directly on the bills to each creditor.  That this 
relationship could arise from such a letter as opposed to a bill was not contested, rather the issue 
in Manella was whether the letter established the agency relationship or not.  Thus, the letter 
separate from the bill draft in Page was held to be admissible evidence, and sufficient to 
establish agency.201 
In addition to the references to agency law, Manella has been cited as one of many early 
American maritime cases supporting the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over 
admiralty law where the English admiralty court would not exercise jurisdiction.202 
The United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited Manella in 1857 to establish 
the limited authority of an agent to act on behalf of the principal.203  The facts in The Joseph 
Grant, are similar to those in Manella and are worth discussion here.  In The Joseph Grant, 
Fitzhugh & Littlejohn, a grain company, was purchasing corn in Chicago and shipping it to 
Oswego, New York on the schooner Joseph Grant.204  George M. Chapman was the master 
onboard the ship, and had duplicate bills of lading consigning the cargo to Fitzhugh & 
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Littlejohn.205  In the course of the shipment, Chapman wrote a blank bill of lading drawing on 
the Marine Bank of Chicago to cover advances on drafts.206  Soon after the receipt of the corn, 
Fitzhugh & Littlejohn’s business failed, and the Marine Bank of Chicago brought suit against the 
vessel for failing to deliver the cargo described in the blank bill of lading which Chapman filled 
out.207  The Circuit Court held that Chapman exceeded his authority as Fitzhugh & Littlejohn’s 
agent in writing the bill of lading to the Marine Bank of Chicago, and the suit would not be 
enforced against the vessel for failing to deliver the cargo.208   
This is consistent with the holding in Manella because the facts are distinguishable.  In 
both cases, an agent went beyond his principal’s stipulations.  However in Manella, Menendez’s 
actions were consistent with Lacosta’s written instructions directing Barry to rely on Menendez’s 
verbal instructions.  Additionally, Lacosta wrote in his initial letter to Barry that he may ship 
tobacco above the price of $10 per quintal209 so as to expedite the shipment.  There is an element 
of trust built into Lacosta’s instructions, both in Barry and in Menendez acting as agent, and the 
Court found Barry’s actions to be reasonable given the circumstances.  In contrast, Chapman’s 
actions in The Joseph Grant could not bind his principal because they went beyond the scope of 
the agency relationship.  Chapman wrote a blank bill of lading to a creditor that did not have 
cargo to support it, an action that the principal knew nothing about.  The bill of lading was not 
enforceable against the vessel because the agency relationship was a limited one.  Thus, a 
principal will not be bound to an agent’s actions of which he has no knowledge or consent. 
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The United States Circuit Court of Virginia cited Manella in 1805, again related to 
agency law.  In Dunbar v. Miller, Manella was cited in a summary of decisions by United States 
federal courts relating to a principal and agent, and consignor and consignee.210   
V. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PEOPLE IN THE STORY 
At the time of his favorable verdict in Manella v. Barry, James Barry no longer lived in 
Baltimore and was near the end of his life.  In 1805, Barry and his family had moved from 
Washington to New York, where Barry lived until his death in 1808.211  Barry died of influenza 
in January of 1808, and Archbishop John Carroll expressed concern for Barry’s declining health 
in a letter to Joanna Barry in June of 1806.212  Thus, it is unlikely that Barry was involved in the 
Spanish-American trade networks that led to the conflict in Manella v. Barry following 
adjudication of the case. 
As for the Spanish actors in the case, there is little to no reference to them beyond the 
court records of Manella v. Barry.  A review of Spanish consuls and their trade networks lists 
Bernardo Lacosta as one of thirty-six Spanish merchants who received letters from John 
Stoughton, Spanish Consul to New England between 1795 and 1820.213  In this record, Lacosta’s 
name is spelled “Bernardo La Costa.”  There is inconsistency in the names of other Spanish 
actors in the case, likely because of variable translations.214  This makes recordkeeping a 
challenge, but it is not unlikely that Manella, Pujals & Co., the Spanish trading firm illegally 
importing tobacco could not sustain the $100,000 loss of cargo onboard the Muqueni, Minerva, 
and Henrietta, plus the costs of adjudication, and dissolved after paying its creditors. 
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The merchant ships are also sparsely mentioned in historical records from the time of the 
case.  The Polly and Nancy, one of the ships that successfully made it to Cadíz, originated in 
South Carolina and was built in 1761.  It was owned by Daniel Hutchings and Edward Blake.215  
The dearth of information on the seven merchant ships involved in this case could be because 
they were subsequently captured on other international trade missions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The conflict between Manella, Pujals & Co. and James Barry in this case demonstrates 
the risks inherent to overseas trade during wartime.  The lucrative nature of the contraband 
tobacco trade in Spain was enough to compel Manella to brave exposure to French and British 
privateers in the waters of the Mediterranean.  That over half of the ships dispatched by Barry 
arrived successfully is surprising given the high likelihood of capture by privateers during the 
Quasi-War with France.  In the subsequent Napoleonic Wars between Britain and France and the 
War of 1812, blockades of the East Coast crippled American trade, and likely kept these same 
ships from reentering American ports if they had not already been captured.  
More than anything, Manella v. Barry depicts the intricate Spanish-American maritime 
trade networks that existed during wartime.  The friendships that established the foundation of 
the trade relationships in this story show that international business trusts began with personal 
relationships such as that between Archbishop John Carroll and James Barry.  That Spanish 
consuls were sent to reside in America indicates the crown’s acknowledgement of the need to 
establish these relationships.  Spanish consuls were further instantiated into American culture as 
some married into American families. 
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The law coming out of this case on the rules of agency in maritime trading was not new.  
Chief Justice John Marshall himself acknowledged that it was well-established that a third party 
must obey the instructions of an agent.  What Manella added to the law on agency is the scope of 
an agent’s authority in effectuating an overseas trade.  The Court put great stake on the fact that 
Menendez’s instructions to Barry were reasonable given America’s loss of neutrality status, and 
in furtherance of the overall enterprise of the principal.  This was consistent with the established 
roles of agent and principal at the time and today.  Since the law surrounding this conflict seems 
straightforward, it is likely that Manella sought recovery from Barry because the firm could not 
pay its creditors without income from the tobacco, and sued in a last ditch effort to get money 
from the wealthy American merchant. 
VII. APPENDIX 
  The following biography details the life of James Barry, the central actor in Manella v. 
Barry.  This section serves to further develop the background of this historical figure, placing the 
case in context of the lives involved. 
 
 
a. Profile of James Barry 
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216 
  James Barry (1755? – 1808) was born in Ireland and lived in India and Portugal before 
arriving with his wife Joanna in Baltimore. 217  There is some inconsistency as to when Barry 
first arrived in Baltimore.  A biographical sketch of Barry written in 1940 references 1793 as the 
date he arrived in Baltimore, but a 1979 article in the Maryland Historical Magazine notes that 
Barry was appointed Vice-Counsel of Portugal for Maryland and Virginia in 1791.218  All 
sources agree that Barry served as the Portuguese Counsel.219  
  The first references to Barry as a Baltimore merchant are in The Maryland Journal and 
Baltimore Advertiser in 1794 and Barry is listed as a merchant in the Baltimore Town and Fell’s 
Point Directory in 1796 as a merchant of 100 Baltimore street.220  Barry is also listed as a charter 
member of the Library Company of Baltimore on December 20, 1795, which merged with the 
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Maryland Historical Society in 1854.221  His name disappears from Baltimore’s business and 
residence directories in 1802 because Barry had moved to Washington D.C. and later to New 
York.222  This absence is consistent with the difficulty the Circuit Court of Maryland had in 
getting Barry to appear in court in May of 1801 during his trial.223  In addition to Barry’s move 
to new cities, there are references to Barry losing his fortune.224  He was likely experiencing 
financial troubles around the time of his trial and may have ceased to conduct his business 
activities in Baltimore, accounting for his absence from business records.225 
  By all accounts, James Barry was an upstanding gentleman and merchant.  Even Robert 
Goodloe Harper stated at Barry’s Supreme Court trial that representing Manella against Barry 
was the hardest case of his entire career because he had to “urge a claim against an honourable 
and respectable man.”226  Thomas Law, a friend of Barry’s, wrote that he found Mr. Barry a 
“very gentlemanly man, [who] was extremely civil, offering me, in the most friendly manner, his 
services during my stay in Baltimore.”227  Indeed a gentleman, Barry was invited to dine with 
George Washington at Mt. Vernon on October 24, 1797.228 
  An interesting diversion from the consistently favorable references to Barry’s character 
was an incident involving a fatal duel.   Barry was involved as “second” for Mr. Thomas 
Hadfield in a duel with David Sterett on Friday April 29, 1791 in Howard Park, in which Mr. 
Sterett was killed.229  Barry and William Buchanan were charged with aiding and abetting 
Sterett’s murder, but were granted a nolle prosequi by John Eager Howard, Esq. who presided 
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over the case as Governor of Maryland.230  Luther Martin was Maryland’s Attorney General at 
the time, and brought the case against Barry and Buchanan.231  Martin would later find himself 
arguing in Barry’s defense at the Circuit Court trial of Manella v. Barry.  Thirty four men 
petitioned the Court in Barry’s favor, and Jas Calhoun wrote a letter attesting to Barry’s good 
character.232 
  James Barry was a Roman Catholic, and it was a religious tie that initially involved him 
in Spanish-American trading networks.233  Bishop John Carroll introduced Barry to Josef de 
Jáudenes, “the only man with authority to sell trading permits to Cuba in the 1790s” and José 
Ignacio Viar.234  This initial connection led Barry to procure crown contracts to supply Spanish 
troops with flour.235 Archbishop Carroll corresponded frequently with Mr. and Mrs. Barry, and 
his letter of June 19, 1806 is cited by the Maryland Historical Society in a Selected Bibliography 
on Maryland History in Other Journals.236  Carroll’s letters to the Barry family convey with 
affection and warmth that he saw them as his closest friends.237  By this time, Joanna and James 
lived in New York, and Archbishop Carroll expressed interest in visiting and concern for James 
Barry’s health.238  When Barry’s will was executed in New York in 1807, Bishop John Carroll 
was executor along with Colonel John Eagar Howard, Governor and Senator of Maryland.239 
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240 
Beyond the initial introduction between Barry and the Spanish diplomats, Bishop John 
Carroll’s relationship with Barry likely influenced the procurement of the 1,528 hogsheads of 
tobacco in the transaction at issue in Manella v. Barry.  John Carroll’s father, Daniel Carroll, was 
a prominent planter and landowner in colonial Maryland whose property included land in 
Southern Maryland used to cultivate tobacco.  As the first Roman Catholic bishop, John Carroll 
occupied a position of great influence among other Catholics in Maryland during the colonial 
period, who would have been landowners cultivating tobacco themselves.  Whether it was 
Carroll tobacco that Barry sent to Manella or tobacco from John Carroll’s associates, the 
Catholic Church in Maryland likely profited from Barry’s transaction with Manella. 
John Carroll’s archdiocese could have profited from Barry’s transaction in two ways.  
First, if the tobacco sent to Manella was Carroll tobacco, the family owned plantations would 
have directly benefitted from the large transaction.  A second and more definitive possibility is 
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based on the tobacco tax.  Proceeds from this tax went directly to the church.241  It was common 
in the eighteenth century for taxes to be levied on tobacco to build church buildings, and 
agricultural exports in general were taxed at this time.242  These are both examples of the church 
benefitting from state legislation in Maryland, a practice known as clericalism which was 
common at the time.243  When John Carroll became Archbishop in 1790, he was likely already in 
the early stages of planning the construction of the Baltimore Basilica, which began in 1806.244  
Thus, Archbishop John Carroll would have been interested in potential proceeds from Barry’s 
transaction with Manella, be they direct or indirect, to finance the construction of his Basilica. 
  Following the initial connection that Archbishop John Carroll made, Barry continued to 
cultivate trading relationships in Spain.  James Barry was one of the first merchants given 
permission to do business in Cuba after the Spanish reentry into the war in 1796.  Upon declaring 
war, Cuba and Puerto Rico both needed food, and Spain couldn’t supply it, so the Spanish 
Minister, Marquís de Casa Irujo, opened trade on a monopoly basis with certain merchants.  
James Barry was given a permit to sell 20,000 pounds of flour in Cuba in exchange for having 
provided food to Puerto Rico on credit.245  Barry and Irujo had established a business partnership 
in 1797, and they were able to keep close ties as Irujo married into a distinguished Pennsylvania 
family246 where he lived nearby Barry in Baltimore.247   
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  In June of 1798 during the time of Barry’s involvement with the tobacco shipments at 
issue in Manella, Barry was active in Baltimore’s maritime business.  In preparation for the 
Quasi-War with France, Barry was selected by his peers with four other merchants in Baltimore 
to raise funds to build a Ship of War out of Baltimore.248  They raised over $100,000 which 
financed the construction of two ships.249  The ships were built in Fell’s Point, where Barry 
owned a wharf and the Baltimore clippers were built.250  In 1800, Barry formed a Baltimore 
based firm for maritime commerce.251  Years later in 1807, Thomas Kemp built a ship for Barry 
in Fell’s Point.252  Barry likely intended this firm to have a grain store in Baltimore in 
partnership with Thomas Law’s agency house from his East India Trading commissions.253  
Barry’s relationship with Law began when they lived in East India where they congregated with 
other foreign born merchants.254  Barry and Law also incorporated the Washington Canal 
Company with funds they raised beginning in 1803, which became a considerable and respected 
business.255  
  Following the conflict with Manella, Barry continued to engage in the tobacco trade in 
Spain.  In February of 1799, there was a glut of royal tobacco in Venezuela that needed to be 
sold to foreign neutrals in order to garner a profit for the royal monopoly which controlled 
Venezuelan tobacco.  In April of that year, Spanish-American ports were closed to neutrals, and 
Venezuelan tobacco seller Fernández de León sought help from Casa Irujo, Spanish Minister to 
the United States, to find Americans willing to transport and sell the Spanish tobacco in Holland.  
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James Barry agreed to do this, and transported a portion of the excess tobacco to Holland on his 
ship, the Fly.  This meant that Barry had to carry false papers and lie about the ownership of the 
tobacco if captured by British privateers.256  Barry did the same in 1797 when he shipped royal 
tobacco on the brig Paramaribo from Baltimore to Cádiz.257  The ship was stopped by a British 
blockade, and went to the port of Málaga where it was captured by a French privateer.258 
  Beyond his career in the maritime shipping business, Barry was also active politically as 
a member of the Federalist party.259  A bipartisan group elected Barry as President of the First 
Chamber in the first Washington D.C. local election on May 3, 1802.260  Barry was elected again 
at the third election in 1804.261  Barry declined to serve as a member of the City Council because 
he was frequently away from the city, both in Baltimore and New York.262  Barry was also 
elected to the board of trustees of the Public Schools in 1905, but declined to serve for the same 
reason.263  
  In 1800, Barry moved to Washington, and in 1805 to New York where he lived until his 
death in 1808.264  He appears in New York City directories from 1805 – 1808 as Consul for 
Maryland and Virginia at Washington, merchant, and Consul for Portugal for the east States and 
New York.265  The N.Y. Evening Post published notice of Barry’s death on Jan. 7, 1808 from a 
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lingering illness due to influenza and tuberculosis caused by stagnant waters in Washington, an 
illness which also took Joanna and James’ daughter Mary.266 
  The Barry homes in Baltimore and Washington have a storied history.  In Baltimore, 
Patapsco tax records show Barry living in a simple home on Homewood between 1798 and 1801, 
now the site of Johns Hopkins Homewood Campus.  Barry conveyed his Homewood property 
consisting of half of Merryman’s Lot to Charles Carroll on February 12, 1801 after he and his 
family moved to Washington.267  There the Barry family resided at 1321 Third Street, S.E. which 
the Barrys put up for sale in 1802 when they moved to New York.268  The proceeds from this 
sale comprised Barry’s estate which he bequeathed to his wife Joanna upon his death.  Acting in 
the strong Catholic faith of the Barry family, Joanna gave $2,000 to St. Mary’s Church which 
became Barry’s Chapel at the intersection of One-Half and P Street, S.W. in Washington.269  
Barry and his daughters Ann and Mary were buried beneath the chapel.270  “Many historians . . . 
assert that Barry Chapel . . . was the first edifice erected for Catholic worship in the City of 
Washington.”271  Barry’s estate also included seven family portraits by the famous painter 
Gilbert Stuart.272 
                                                     
266 Id. at 9. 
267 William B. Marye, Baltimore City Place Names, Part 4, 59 Maryland Historical Magazine, 78 (1964). 
268 Allen C. Clark, supra note 218 at 10. 
269 Id. at 13; see image accompanying note 273. 
270 Id. at 14. 
271 Margaret Brent Downing, The Development of the Catholic Church in the District of Columbia from Colonial 
Times until the Present, 15 RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 23, 48 (1912). 
272 Allen C. Clark, supra note 218 at 12. 
47 
 
 273 
 
                                                     
273 Current Google Maps image of the site of Barry’s Chapel at One-Half and P Street S.W. in Washington D.C. 
